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Abstract
We study preferences over lotteries in which both the prize and the payment date are
uncertain. In particular, a time lottery is one in which the prize is fixed but the date is ran-
dom. With Expected Discounted Utility, individuals must be risk seeking over time lotteries
(RSTL). In an incentivized experiment, however, we find that almost all subjects violate this
property. Our main contributions are theoretical. We first show that within a very broad
class of models, which includes many forms of non-Expected Utility and time discounting,
it is impossible to accommodate even a single violation of RSTL without also violating a
property we termed Stochastic Impatience, a risky counterpart of standard Impatience. We
then offer two positive results. If one wishes to maintain Stochastic Impatience, violations
of RSTL can be accommodated by keeping Independence within periods while relaxing it
across periods. If, instead, one is willing to forego Stochastic Impatience, violations of
RSTL can be accommodated with a simple generalization of Expected Discounted Utility,
obtained by imposing only the behavioral postulates of Discounted Utility and Expected
Utility.
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1 Introduction
Consider the choice between (i) receiving a prize in period t¯ for sure, or (ii) receiving
the same prize in a random period t with mean t¯. For example, the choice may
involve receiving a desirable outcome (such as $100 or a dinner at a fancy restaurant)
in 10 weeks for sure versus either 5 or 15 weeks with equal probability. Both options
deliver the same prize and have the same expected delivery date, but in one of them
the date is uncertain. What would, or should, one choose? More generally, what
are individuals’ attitudes towards uncertainty not only about which outcome will be
realized, but also about when this outcome will be received? Are they captured by
existing models and, if not, how can they be modeled? How do they interact with
other notions of risk and time preferences? These are the questions that this paper
studies.
Many economic decisions involve uncertainty about both which and when out-
comes will be received. Home sellers are typically uncertain not only about the sale
price but also about how quickly the house will be sold. When starting a new project,
investors do not know how much dividends the project will pay and when they will be
paid. Looking for a job involves uncertainty about which job will be found, and when.
Both dimensions of uncertainty, and possibly their interaction, matter for choice in
these and other domains. In many cases the uncertainty pertains only, or predomi-
nantly, to timing. For example, one may know she will inherit a specific house, but not
when. Similarly, with public housing and other government-provided services, much
of the uncertainty concerns the time these will be provided. When shopping online,
is it worthwhile to pay an additional fee to ensure delivery at a guaranteed rather
than random date? All such choices depend on one’s attitudes towards randomness
in time.
We introduce a notion of risk attitudes towards lotteries in which the timing is
random: time lotteries. Just like regular (atemporal) risk aversion is defined by a
preference for a sure amount over a lottery with the same expected value fixing the
date, the individual is Risk Averse Over Time Lotteries (RATL) if she prefers to
receive a fixed prize in a sure date rather than at a random date with equal expected
delay. She is Risk Seeking over Time Lotteries (RSTL) if she displays the opposite
pattern. While these definitions compare payments in a sure vs. a random date, they
have implications for when both lotteries are random, the mean dates are not equal,
or both prizes and dates are random. To capture attitudes toward time lotteries based
on intrinsic preferences and not on planning motives, we assume that all uncertainty
is resolved as soon as one of the options is chosen.1
Our starting point is the observation that the standard model in economics, Ex-
pected Discounted Utility (EDU), prescribes that all subjects must be globally RSTL.
To see this, note that if u(x) > 0 is the utility of prize x and β ∈ (0, 1) is the dis-
1If instead uncertainty were gradually resolved over time, the absence of risk could improve
planning. We want to separate this instrumental benefit from intrinsic preferences.
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count factor, then the value of receiving x at time t is βtu(x), whereas the value
of the lottery with a random date is E[βt]u(x). Since βt is convex in t, the latter
option is always preferred. Note that the curvature of the utility function over prizes
plays no role in this comparison. This aspect of the standard model has important
implications, with many papers relying crucially, and explicitly, on it (e.g., Ely and
Szydlowski 2017; Zhong 2019).2
As the standard model makes such sharp predictions, we start our investigation
by testing them in incentivized experiments. (Previous work, discussed below, only
used unincentivized surveys.) These predictions fail to hold in our data: only a small
fraction is consistently RSTL; instead, most subjects are risk averse in the majority
of questions. Attitudes towards time lotteries are also correlated with standard risk
aversion, an intuitive connection that is missing from EDU.
In light of these findings, we present a series of theoretical results on modeling
general attitudes towards uncertainty in both prize and date. We confine our analysis
to preferences over lotteries of dated rewards, that is, pairs of the form (x, t), where
x is a monetary prize and t is the time in which it is received.3
Our first theoretical question is: Can we have a model that allows for at least
one violation of RSTL, while keeping other desirable properties?4 To this end, we
consider a new property, called Stochastic Impatience. Intuitively, it requires that,
when facing lotteries that pay different outcomes in different periods, the individual
prefers to associate higher payments to earlier dates. Consider two prizes, say $100
and $20, and two periods, say a day and a month. Stochastic Impatience requires
the individual to prefer the 50/50 lottery that pays either $100 in a day or $20 in
a month, over the 50/50 lottery that pays either $100 in a month or $20 in a day.
As such, it is a risky counterpart to the standard notion of Impatience; under EDU,
Impatience and Stochastic Impatience imply each other. Note that the choice above
can be rephrased as: Given a base lottery paying $20 either in a day or a month,
which prize do we want to increase by $80, the earlier or the later one? To the extent
that receiving earlier payments is better, the individual should prefer the first option,
in accordance with Stochastic Impatience.
The answer to our question is an impossibility result about the coexistence of
violations of RSTL and Stochastic Impatience. The result holds under very mild as-
sumptions: when there is no risk, individuals like receiving higher payments, dislike
waiting, and are not future biased (their preferences may be stationary or present bi-
2For example, Zhong (2019) studies dynamic models of information acquisition and shows that
the optimal strategy uses Poisson signals. The reason is that the decision time with Poisson signals
is a mean-preserving spread of other strategies and is thus preferred under EDU due to RSTL.
3We focus on this setup for simplicity. As we show in Appendix A, extensions to lotteries over
streams are immediate. It is also easy to generalize our results to an arbitrary set of outcomes.
4We are not suggesting that individuals should be globally RATL. Indeed, they may change their
attitude when some of the prizes occur in a distant future. For example, subjects may prefer the
lottery between today and two years, over one year for sure due to present bias. They may also
prefer a lottery between one year and one thousand years over five-hundred years for sure, as only
the closest date is conceivable. In intermediate cases, however, we may see instances of RATL.
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ased, but not the converse); and when evaluating risky prospects, they follow a Local
Bilinear model (a very general form that includes Expected Utility and common non-
Expected Utility models, such as Cumulative Prospect Theory or Disappointment
Aversion). With these general assumptions, we show that Stochastic Impatience im-
plies RSTL. That is, under very general conditions satisfied by virtually all models
used in practice, there is a fundamental incompatibility between Stochastic Impa-
tience and even a single violation of RSTL.
Given this impossibility, our second question is: Is there a plausible way to gener-
alize EDU to allow for at least some violations of RSTL? We give two solutions, the
merit of each depends on the (subjective) importance one attaches to the properties
being relaxed.
First, we show that violations of RSTL together with Stochastic Impatience can be
accommodated by relaxing Independence in a way specific to the intertemporal setup:
maintaining it within but not across periods (so that it also violates Bilinearity). To
illustrate this, we provide an example of a functional form – borrowed from the finance
literature – with these features. As we discuss in Section 4.1, this approach is related
to the order in which time and risk are aggregated.
Second, we show how RSTL can be accommodated while maintaining full Indepen-
dence if one is willing to forego Stochastic Impatience. In fact, this can be achieved
by keeping all the main properties used to motivate EDU. While EDU can be seen
as merging the functional form of Discounted Utility without risk with the one of
Expected Utility, we instead impose the properties that characterize each of them.
A simple result is that these properties together do not characterize EDU, but lead
to a more general model, that we call Generalized EDU (GEDU), in which there is
a strictly increasing utility function over prizes u, a discount factor β, and a strictly
increasing function φ, such that preferences are represented by
E
[
φ
(
βtu(x)
)]
.
GEDU is similar to models in the literature (in particular, Kihlstrom and Mirman
1974 applied to time). Unlike EDU, GEDU can accommodate different attitudes
towards time lotteries, with the individual being RATL if and only if φ is more concave
than the log function. More generally, and in accordance with our experimental
findings, a more concave φ implies that subjects are both more risk averse in an
atemporal setting and more averse to time lotteries.
Related Literature. A small literature has discussed attitudes towards time lot-
teries. Chesson and Viscusi (2003) show that EDU implies a preference for random
timing. They hypothesize that risk aversion over time may be due to high risk aver-
sion or hyperbolic discounting. The latter is proven impossible by Onay and O¨ncu¨ler
(2007), who generalize their theoretical results, pointing out that (what we call) RSTL
holds for any convex discount function and link it to probability distortions. Chen
(2013) also shows that EDU implies RSTL. Ebert (2017) extends the analysis to
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higher-order risk preferences (prudence and temperance). We show that RATL can
be accommodated within the framework of Expected Utility; at the same time, if
one wants to preserve Stochastic Impatience, then not even allowing for probability
distortions is sufficient.
For experimental evidence, Chesson and Viscusi (2003) conduct a hypothetical
survey with business owners and find that about a third of them are RATL. Onay
and O¨ncu¨ler (2007) run a non-incentivized survey with large hypothetical payments
and find that most subjects are RATL. By contrast, Kacelnik and Bateson (1996)
show evidence that animals in foraging decisions tend to be RSTL. Eliaz and Ortoleva
(2016) show that subjects are ambiguity averse when timing is ambiguous.
2 Risk Aversion over Time Lotteries
Consider an interval of monetary prizes [w, b] ⊂ R++ and a set of dates T ⊂ R+
consisting of either non-negative consecutive integers (“discrete time”) or an interval
of non-negative numbers (“continuous time”), with 0 ∈ T in both cases. The ordered
pair (x, t) ∈ [w, b] × T denotes receiving an amount of money x in t periods. Let
∆ be the set of simple lotteries over [w, b] × T endowed with the topology of weak
convergence, and δ(x,t) denote the degenerate lottery that gives (x, t) with certainty.
We study a complete and transitive preference relation % over ∆, where ∼ and ≻
denote its symmetric and asymmetric parts, respectively. To avoid trivial cases, when
T is discrete, we assume that it has at least three elements and that the outcome space
is rich enough so that δ(b,t+1) ≻ δ(w,t−1) for any t that is neither the minimal nor the
maximal element of T . Intuitively, this condition rules out the possibility that either
the space of prizes is so small or discounting so strong that getting even the worst
prize one period sooner is better than waiting one more period for the best prize.
Both in the theoretical part and in our experiment, we focus on lotteries in which
uncertainty is resolved immediately. Therefore, preferences in our setting are static
and do not stem from planning considerations. We do so to focus on the starkest case
in which only time and risk preferences are at play. While introducing benefits from
planning or preferences over the timing of resolution of uncertainty may strengthen the
appeal of risk-free options, our goal is to investigate — empirically and theoretically
— individuals’ intrinsic attitudes towards such uncertainty.
Standard risk aversion is defined by positing that an individual prefers a sure
amount to a lottery of the same expected value – all within a fixed date. We take
an analogous approach to define risk attitudes towards uncertainty about the time,
by considering lotteries that pay a fixed prize x at a random time: we call them time
lotteries. For example, a time lottery could pay $100 in either one or two months.
Formally, for any x ∈ [w, b], we say that px ∈ ∆ is a time lottery with prize x if y = x
for any (y, t) in its support.
Definition 1. The relation % is Risk Averse over Time Lotteries (RATL) if for all
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x ∈ [w, b] and all time lotteries px with prize x, if t¯ =
∑
τ px(x, τ)× τ then
δ(x,t¯) % px.
Analogously, % is Risk Seeking over Time Lotteries (RSTL) or Risk Neutral over
Time Lotteries (RNTL) if the above holds with - or ∼, respectively.
In words, the individual is RATL if she prefers to receive a certain amount in
a sure time to receiving the same amount on a random time with the same mean.
RSTL and RNTL are defined analogously. While RATL (and its counterparts) are
defined only for comparisons between sure dates and lotteries with the same expected
date, in most models they have implications on general attitudes about risk in timing
– just like standard risk aversion (defined as a comparison between a sure prize and
random one) has implications on general risk preferences.5
The standard model to study risk and time is Expected Discounted Utility (EDU),
according to which lotteries are evaluated by
V (p) = Ep
[
βtu(x)
]
, (1)
where u is a positive-valued utility function over money and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount
factor.6 EDU evaluates a time lottery with prize x as Ep
[
βt
]
u(x). Since βt is a convex
function of t, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that, independently of u, any EDU
preference relation must be RSTL.
In fact, this argument holds more generally since it only relies on the convexity of
the discount function. Suppose that preferences are represented by
V (p) = Ep
[
D(t)u(x)
]
, (2)
where D is a strictly positive and strictly decreasing function with D(0) = 1. Then,
preferences are RSTL if and only ifD is convex. All discount functions used in practice
– including exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic – are convex.7 Moreover,
when T is unbounded, no strictly decreasing function D : T → (0, 1] can be concave.
Thus, in this case no preference relation represented by (2) can be RATL.8
5For example, one may define attitudes towards time lotteries in terms of preferences for mean-
preserving spreads in time. Under EDU, and more generally in the GEDU model described in
Section 4.2, RATL coincides with an aversion to mean-preserving spreads because of Independence,
so these definitions are equivalent.
6The utility u must be positive in our setting of lotteries over dated rewards. In settings that
include streams, if u(0) is the value of getting nothing, direct calculations show that u(x) should be
replaced with u(x)− u(0) > 0, leading to the same observation.
7See Supplementary Appendix A for the definition of convexity for discrete T . We also test
convexity in our experiment and find that the vast majority of subjects satisfy it. Convex discounting
is implied by No Future Bias, a property that we discuss in detail in Section 3.
8The risk attitudes towards time lotteries in Definition 1 are defined for arbitrary periods and
prizes. In Supplementary Appendix A, we introduce their local counterparts, relate it to the local
convexity/concavity of the discount function, and show that preferences represented by (2) must be
locally-RSTL in all but a finite number of periods.
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The impossibility of EDU to accommodate different attitudes towards time lot-
teries can be understood with an analogy to the work of Yaari (1987). Within the
(atemporal) Expected Utility framework, diminishing marginal utility of income and
risk aversion are bound together via the curvature of the utility function over prizes.
But, as Yaari argues, these two properties are “horses of different colors” and hence,
as a fundamental principle, a theory that keeps them separate may be desirable. In
our setting, convex discounting, which is a property of deterministic settings, implies
RSTL, a property of stochastic settings. There is no fundamental reason why the two
should be related. Moreover, in Yaari’s analysis even though diminishing marginal
utility of income and risk aversion relate to two different phenomena, they are both
reasonable and documented properties. In our case, however, while convex discount-
ing is a plausible and documented behavioral property, we now provide evidence that
most people violate RSTL.
2.1 Experimental evidence of RATL
We now describe the results of an incentivized experiment that measures attitudes
towards time lotteries. Because the purpose of this section is primarily to motivate our
theoretical results, we postpone in-depth analyses to Appendix D. The experiment
below uses monetary payments. For robustness, we also conducted an experiment
with real effort tasks. The results are qualitatively in line with the ones below and
are described in Appendix D.4.
Design. 196 subjects took part in an experiment run at the Wharton Behavioral
Lab. The experiment has three parts. Part I asks subjects to choose between different
time lotteries: two options that paid the same prize at different dates, where the
distribution of payment dates of one option was a mean preserving spread of that of
the other. For example, the first question asked them to choose between i) $15 in
2 weeks or ii) $15 in 1 week with probability 3
4
and in 5 weeks with probability 1
4
.
Subjects answered five questions of this kind; in two of them, both options involved
random payment dates. Table 2 in Appendix D lists the questions.
Parts II and III use the Multiple Price List (MPL) method to measure time and
risk preferences separately. Part II measures standard time preferences as well as
attitudes towards time lotteries. Part III measures atemporal risk preferences, with
payments taking place immediately at the end of the session. These include measures
of regular risk aversion, as well as Allais’ common-ratio-type questions.
At the end of the experiment, one question was randomly selected for payment.
The order of parts and questions was partly randomized, except that all subjects
received Part I first, and all subjects received the same first question on a separate
sheet of paper. The answer to this question is a key indication of the subjects’
preferences, as it captures their reaction uncontaminated by other questions.
We ran two treatments: a long delay treatment (‘Long’; 105 subjects) and a short
delay treatment (‘Short’; 91 subjects). Two questions were identical; in the others,
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Table 1: Attitude Towards Time Lotteries in Part I
% of RATL choices Long Short
Question 1 65.7 56.0
All questions 60.6 47.9
Both dates random 69.0 45.6
# of RATL
choices
Long Short
Percent Cum. Percent Cum.
0 2.9 2.9 9.9 9.9
1 9.5 12.4 16.5 26.4
2 22.9 35.2 24.3 50.6
3 23.8 59.0 26.4 76.9
4 28.6 87.6 19.8 96.7
5 12.4 100.0 3.3 100.0
the treatment differed in the length of the delays: the maximum delay was 12 weeks
in the Long treatment and 5 weeks in the Short treatment.
Results, RATL. Our main results pertain to the attitude towards time lotteries,
elicited in the five questions of Part I. Table 1 presents the percentage of RATL
choices in i) Question 1 of Part I, ii) all questions, and iii) only questions in which
both option involved random dates. It also shows the distribution of the number of
RATL answers that each subject gave (where 0 means never RATL, 5 means always
RATL).
In both treatments, only a minuscule (2.86% or 9.89%) fraction of subjects are
consistently RSTL; instead, the majority of subjects choose according to RATL in
the majority of questions. This pattern holds also in the first question and when both
options are risky. As discussed above, these findings are not compatible with EDU.
Significance and Difference Between Treatments. While EDU predicts that
all choices should be RSTL, one may consider stochastic extensions that account for
randomness in individuals’ choice (Luce, 1958; McFadden, 2005). In these models,
subjects may prefer the RSTL option, yet occasionally choose the other one ‘by
mistake.’9 Is our data compatible with such random extension of EDU? We can
reject it, in two ways.
9For example, the individual may assign a higher utility to the RSTL option, but choose it with a
frequency based on the ratio between the utilities of the two (Luce, 1958). When close to indifference,
the frequency is close to 50/50. This is the case in typical stochastic choice models (Luce, 1958;
McFadden, 2005). A recent literature expressed concerns in using these models for risk and time
preference (Apesteguia and Ballester, 2018). If, instead, we use the random parameter model that
Apesteguia et al. (2017) proposed to deal with these concerns, RSTL should be always chosen.
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First, in any such stochastic extension, the individual should choose the option
with the higher utility more frequently (this is true in any of these models, as long as
the error is symmetric); under EDU, this should be the RSTL option. Indeed, even
assuming a high level of noise and small utility difference, the RATL option should
be chosen at most 50% of the time. This is not what we observe: in the first question,
for example, the proportion of RATL choices is significantly larger than 50% (Exact
Binomial Probability Test, p=0.002).10
Second, we can compare behavior across treatments, as some questions were differ-
ent.11 In particular, in Q5 of the Short treatment, the prize was $15 and the options
were (i) 50% in 2 weeks, 50% in 5 weeks vs. (ii) 75% in 3 weeks, 25% in 5 weeks.
In the Long treatment, option (i) was identical, but (ii) was replaced by (ii’ ) 75%
in 1 week, 25% in 11 weeks. Both (ii) and (ii’ ) are mean preserving spreads of (i),
and should thus be chosen under EDU; but (ii’ ) is also a mean-preserving spread of
(ii). Under EDU, the utility difference is thus smaller between (i) and (ii), as in the
Short treatment, and larger between (i) and (ii’ ), as in the Long treatment. RSTL
choices for this question should then be more frequent in the Long treatment. But we
find the opposite: RSTL is significantly less frequent in the Long treatment (26.67%
vs. 47.25%; Fishers Exact Test, p = 0.003). Our data is therefore not compatible not
only with EDU, but also with typical random choice extensions of it.
RATL, Convexity, Risk Aversion. Next, we analyze the relationship between
RATL, convexity of discounting (measured using the questions on time preferences),
atemporal risk aversion, and violations of Expected Utility (see Appendix D.3 for
details and statistical analysis). In line with previous findings, 82% of our subjects
exhibit convex discounting. We also find that 39.89% choose approximately according
to Expected Utility over atemporal lotteries. Focusing on subjects in either of these
two groups, RATL is still prevalent, with almost identical proportions as in the entire
sample. Regression analysis confirms that certainty bias or convexity of discounting
are generally uncorrelated with RATL.12
Lastly, we test the relation between the tendency to exhibit RATL and atemporal
risk aversion. Here we find a significant correlation: subjects who are more risk averse
over money also tend to be more RATL (Table 10 in Appendix D.3). This is intuitive,
as both are forms of risk aversion; as we have seen, however, it is hard to reconcile
this connection within EDU.
10Moreover, the distribution of answers across the five questions is significantly different from a
Binomial distribution (Chi-Square Goodness of Fit, p = 0.0083 for Short, p = 0.0000 for Long).
11For the two questions that were identical (Q1 and Q3), differences in behavior are not significant
(Fisher exact test, p = 0.187 for Q1; p = 0.148 for Q3).
12As shown above, this is not compatible with EDU, where RSTL is connected with the convexity
of discounting. These results also suggest that RATL may not be due to violations of Expected
Utility, as opposed to the hypothesis of Chesson and Viscusi (2003) and Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007).
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3 Stochastic Impatience and Impossibility Results
We have seen that EDU cannot accommodate even a single violation of RSTL. In this
section, we show that under mild assumptions, any violation of RSTL is incompatible
with a property that we call Stochastic Impatience.
Stochastic Impatience. Consider the choice between:
A Receive either $100 today or $20 in a month, with probability 1
2
each;
B Receive either $20 today or $100 in a month, with probability 1
2
each.
Both options involve the same prizes, probabilities, and dates, but in the first
one the higher prize is associated with the earlier date, keeping the same odds. One
could imagine that, to the extent that the individual prefers higher payments sooner,
this option should be preferred. An appealing argument for this property could be
made by decomposing each alternative into two parts. Observe that both A and B
offer the same basic lottery in which the individual receives $20 either today or in a
month. The difference between them is which payment is increased by $80: option A
increases today’s, while option B the payment in a month. Insofar as earlier is better,
option A should be preferred. Indeed, this property can be seen as a counterpart of
Impatience for risky environments.
Formally, Stochastic Impatience requires that if (in the presence of risk) the in-
dividual can choose to pair each monetary payment to a different delivery time, she
would pair the highest outcome with the earliest date. A companion paper, Dillen-
berger et al. (2018), discusses its relation with models that separate risk and time
preferences.13
Definition 2 (Stochastic Impatience). The relation % satisfies Stochastic Impa-
tience if for any t1, t2 ∈ T and x1, x2 ∈ X with t1 < t2 and x1 > x2,
1
2
δ(x1,t1) +
1
2
δ(x2,t2) %
1
2
δ(x1,t2) +
1
2
δ(x2,t1).
Basic Properties. We now introduce basic properties we want preferences to sat-
isfy. To keep our analysis as general as possible, we consider the following three
conditions over degenerate lotteries (i.e., when there is no risk):
Axiom 1 (Outcome Monotonicity). For all x, y ∈ [w, b] and s ∈ T, if x > y then
δ(x,s) ≻ δ(y,s).
Axiom 2 (Impatience). For all x ∈ [w, b] and s, t ∈ T , if t < s then δ(x,t) ≻ δ(x,s).
13Our definition below focuses on lotteries with only two outcomes in their support. Our results
remain unchanged if the definition is strengthened to lotteries with n equally likely outcomes. We
focus on this version for simplicity and because we want the weakest condition for our results.
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Axiom 3 (No Future Bias). For all x, y ∈ [w, b], s, t ∈ T with t < s, and τ > 0
with s+ τ, t+ τ ∈ T , if δ(x,t) ∼ δ(y,s) then δ(x,t+τ) - δ(y,t+τ).
The first two axioms are standard monotonicity properties, requiring that the
individual likes higher payments and dislikes delays. No Future Bias states that the
individual’s willingness to pay to bring consumption earlier by a fixed time length
does not increase in time. That is, the rate of substitution between money and time
is non-increasing in time. This property generalizes standard notions of Stationarity,
that requires the rate of substitution to be constant in both money and time, thus
allowing present bias but ruling out the opposite (future bias). No Future Bias is a
weak requirement, widely documented empirically and satisfied by virtually all models
used to study time preferences (not only exponential discounting, but also hyperbolic
or quasi-hyperbolic, developed to account for present bias).
Together, these three conditions impose very few restrictions on preferences. For
example, they do not require preferences over sure outcomes to be represented by a
multiplicatively separable utility function U(x, t) = D(t)u(x). This flexibility even
allows for properties such as the magnitude effect (Noor, 2011), where preferences
over sure outcomes are represented by U(x, t) = (β(x))tu(x), for some increasing
function β(x).
Expected Utility. We first present our results assuming that subjects follow Ex-
pected Utility, imposing Independence and a continuity assumption.
Axiom 4 (Independence). For all p, q, r ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ (0, 1),
p % q ⇔ λp+ (1− λ)r % λq + (1− λ)r.
Axiom 5 (Continuity). For all p ∈ ∆, the sets {q ∈ ∆ : p % q} and {q ∈ ∆ : q % p}
are closed.
It is easy to see that under Axioms 1-5 preferences are represented by
V (p) = Ep
[
U(x, t)
]
, (3)
where U is continuous, strictly increasing in x, strictly decreasing in t, and such that
for t < s and τ > 0, U(x, t) = U(y, s) implies U(x, t+ τ) ≤ U(y, s+ τ).
Note that under Expected Utility, Stochastic Impatience can be rewritten as
1
2
U(x1, t1) +
1
2
U(x2, t2) ≥
1
2
U(x1, t2) +
1
2
U(x2, t1),
that is, U satisfies decreasing differences:
U(x1, t1)− U(x1, t2) ≥ U(x2, t1)− U(x2, t2). (4)
Thus, Stochastic Impatience states that the utility lost by postponing a prize for
one period is higher for higher prizes, and thus the utility is maximized by pairing
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higher prizes with earlier dates and lower prizes with later ones. Put differently,
Stochastic Impatience states that prizes and waiting times are substitutes in U . It is
then easy to see why Stochastic Impatience must be satisfied by any model, including
EDU, where U(x, t) = D(t)u(x) with decreasing D. Indeed, in that case, Stochastic
Impatience is equivalent to Impatience (decreasing D).
Impossibility Under Expected Utility. We are now ready to state our first
impossibility result.
Theorem 1. Suppose % satisfies Axioms 1-5. Then Stochastic Impatience implies
RSTL.
The result above shows that, under the conditions of Axioms 1-5, it is impossible
to have even a single violation of RSTL without violating Stochastic Impatience. For
an intuition, suppose time is continuous and preferences are represented as in (3) with
a twice differentiable U . No Future Bias means that the marginal rate of substitution
between money and time is weakly decreasing, i.e.,
∂
∂t
[
−
∂U
∂t
∂U
∂x
]
≤ 0.
Stochastic Impatience means that money and time are substitutes, so the marginal
disutility of waiting is increasing in the prize ( ∂
2U
∂x∂t
≤ 0). But if the denominator is
decreasing (Stochastic Impatience) and the ratio of marginal utilities is increasing (No
Future Bias), then the numerator must be increasing in t: we must have ∂
2U
∂t2
≥ 0.
This means that the marginal disutility of waiting is decreasing, which is precisely
RSTL.
Another way to understand Theorem 1 is through the lenses of risk aversion.
Recall Options A and B in the discussion of Stochastic Impatience, and observe that
the two prizes offered by Option B (20 today or 100 in a month) are, in terms of
desirability, strictly in between the two prizes offered by Option A (100 today or
20 in a month). In utility terms, Option A has a higher mean but is ‘more spread
out.’ With EDU, only expected utility matters, not its spread, so Option A is strictly
preferred. But an individual who is averse to such spread in utils may prefer to ‘hedge’
between the two, choosing Option B instead. By requiring that the individual prefers
Option A, Stochastic Impatience posits that she cannot be too averse to spreads in
utils. But it is precisely this aversion that allows for instances of RATL: the theorem
shows that to accommodate even one of them, the aversion to spreads must be such
that Stochastic Impatience is violated.
We conclude with a sketch of the proof. The proof of Theorem 1, just like the
one of Theorem 2 below, is constructive: if we observe an instance of RATL, we can
design a choice problem with similar prizes and delivery times, in which the individual
violates Stochastic Impatience. To illustrate, suppose δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t3) for
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some x ∈ [w, b], t1, t2, t3 ∈ T with t2 =
t1+t3
2
. For the purpose of this sketch, suppose
that we can find x′ < x such that δ(x′,t1) ∼ δ(x,t2). By No Future Bias δ(x′,t2) -
δ(x,t3). By Independence and by the assumption above,
1
2
δ(x′,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t2) ∼ δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t3) %
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x′,t2). Thus,
1
2
δ(x′,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x′,t2),
violating Stochastic Impatience. The complete argument appears in Appendix C,
which collects all proofs of results in the main text.
Beyond Expected Utility. Having seen that any violation of RSTL is incompat-
ible with Stochastic Impatience within Expected Utility, it is natural to ask whether
such impossibility holds outside this class. We now show that this is indeed the case.
Consider a model that we call Generalized Local Bilinear Utility (GLBU). This
model replaces Expected Utility with the much weaker assumption of Local Bilinear-
ity: it posits that 50/50 lotteries between (x, t) and (x′, t′), where δ(x,t) % δ(x′,t′), are
evaluated by weighting the utility of (x, t) by π(1
2
) and that of (x′, t′) by (1− π(1
2
)),
and summing them up. When π(1
2
) = 1
2
, the model coincides with Expected Utility
(for 50/50 lotteries); if, instead, π(1
2
) < 1
2
, then the individual underweights the bet-
ter option. This very general model – picked for its generality rather than its intrinsic
appeal – includes as special cases popular ones such as those of probability weighting
(Rank-Dependent Utility, Quiggin 1982, and Cumulative Prospect Theory, Tversky
and Kahneman 1992) and Disappointment Aversion (Gul, 1991).14 Moreover, it re-
stricts preferences only for 50/50 lotteries, leaving complete freedom on the treatment
of other lotteries.
Definition 3. We say that % admits a Generalized Local Bilinear Utility (GLBU)
representation if there is a function U : [w, b] × T → R that represents preferences
over deterministic outcomes satisfying Axioms 1-3 and π(1
2
) ∈ (0, 1), such that p =
1
2
δ(x,t) +
1
2
δ(x′,t′) with δ(x,t) % δ(x′,t′) is evaluated according to:
V (p) = π(
1
2
)U(x, t) + (1− π(
1
2
))U(x′, t′).
To reiterate, a GLBU representation is a very general class that subsumes the
vast majority of commonly used models. For time preferences, it allows for non-
separable forms and non-exponential discounting; for risk, it allows for typical forms
of non-Expected Utility.
Even in this very general class of models, violations of RSTL are still incompatible
with Stochastic Impatience. As GLBU only restricts preferences over binary and
equal-chance lotteries, we will focus on this type of lotteries.
14This specification also allows for generalizations of Rank-Dependent Expected Utility, e.g., the
minimum from a set of probability distortions (Dean and Ortoleva, 2017). However, it does not
encompass all known models of risk preferences (e.g., the Cautious Expected Utility of Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. 2015). Formally, this model is a local specification (at 12 ) of the Bilinear (or Biseparable)
model of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001).
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Theorem 2. Suppose % admits a GLBU representation. If δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1)+
1
2
δ(x,t3)
for some x ∈ [w, b] and t1, t2, t3 ∈ T with t2 =
t1+t3
2
, then % violates Stochastic
Impatience.
4 Two Solutions to Model RATL
We established a fundamental incompatibility between Stochastic Impatience and
any violation of RSTL under the assumptions of Outcome Monotonicity, Impatience,
No Future Bias, and Independence (or, more generally, Local Bilinearity). Given the
appeal of Outcome Monotonicity, Impatience, and No Future Bias, we now explore
how violations of RSTL can be accommodated by dropping one of the remaining
properties. We show that it can be done by either (i) weakening Independence in a
novel way, different from traditional ones and based on the intertemporal nature of
our setup; or (ii) keeping full Independence but not requiring Stochastic Impatience,
allowing a simple and tractable Expected Utility-type solution.
4.1 Drop ‘Intertemporal’ Independence
Our analysis in Section 3 assumes that individuals either evaluate risky prospects us-
ing Expected Utility, or follow one of its common generalizations via Local Bilinearity.
Such generalizations, developed for a-temporal settings under risk and ambiguity, are
based on the idea of underweighting or overweighting options to accommodate for
phenomena like the certainty effect (Allais, 1953).
In an intertemporal setting, however, there are other context-specific relaxations of
Independence. For example, we could require Independence to hold only for lotteries
that pay prizes in the same period, but not for lotteries with prizes in different periods.
One could argue that across-period comparisons involve a complex interaction of
intertemporal tradeoffs that may render Independence less appealing. Formally, let
%t denote the restriction of % to lotteries that pay only in period t (i.e., with (y, s)
in their support only if s = t). Then, we can impose ‘within-period Independence’:
%t satisfies Independence for each t ∈ T . While implied by general Independence, it
is much weaker as it posits no restrictions across periods.
Such a relaxation of Independence is different from the ones implied by the Gen-
eralized Local Bilinear model. In the latter, individuals underweight (or overweight)
the better prize and overweight (or underweight) the worst one, irrespectively of when
each is paid. Thus they violate Independence within period just as much as across
periods, as this general model has no specific distinctions for the intertemporal setup.
In fact, with the restriction above the Generalized Local Bilinear model collapses to
Expected Discounted Utility — if the individual does not distort probabilities within
a period, she never does.
Intuitively, imposing Independence only within-period but not across periods
would be useful precisely because it is the application of Independence across pe-
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riods – even when weakened in the form of Local Bilinearity – that links Stochastic
Impatience to RSTL. Without such a link, these two properties, that are obviously
distinct, can be decoupled.
We illustrate how relaxing ‘intertemporal’ Independence allows for the joint pres-
ence of Stochastic Impatience and RATL with a simple example, derived from the fi-
nance literature and adapted to our setup: the Dynamic Ordinal Certainty Equivalent
(DOCE) model (Selden, 1978; Selden and Stux, 1978). Preferences are represented
by:
V (p) =
∑
t
βtu
(
v−1
(∑
x
pˆ(x, t)v(x)
))
, (5)
where u and v are continuous and strictly increasing, β ∈ (0, 1), and pˆ(x, t) = p(x, t)
for all (x, t) in the support of p and pˆ(0, t) = 1 −
∑
x p(x, t) for all t (throughout
this section we assume that the prize 0, getting nothing, is available and that u(0) =
v(0) = 0). The interpretation is that given a lottery p, the individual computes the
marginal distribution over outcomes for any time period t, calculates the certainty
equivalent of this induced lottery using the function v, and then aggregates these
certainty equivalents as in EDU, with a discount function β and a utility function
u. When no risk is involved, this model coincides with EDU (and thus automatically
satisfies the monotonicity assumptions and No Future Bias). It satisfies Independence
when lotteries pay in the same period, thus within-period Independence holds, but it
violates general Independence. The model is also not Bilinear.
Selden andWei (2019) show that this model always satisfies Stochastic Impatience,
and characterize when it is consistent with RATL.15 It is easy to see why Stochas-
tic Impatience must hold: both lotteries in the definition of Stochastic Impatience
generate the same set of per-period certainty equivalents that are then discounted,
and they only differ in the order these certainty equivalents are received; thus, higher
values sooner must be preferred.16 In fact, this model structurally disregards the
across-period hedging that may lead to violations of Stochastic Impatience. To see
why RSTL may fail, note that from the point of view of this model, the lottery that
gives $y with equal probability at either time t or t′ induces an equal chance lottery
at time t between $0 and $y, and an identical one at t′. If the individual is very risk
averse, i.e., v is very concave, then both these lotteries have a low certainty equiv-
alent, in particular lower than that of getting y for sure at time t+t
′
2
(for which the
curvature of v does not apply).
We should stress that this functional form is just one example of a model that can
accommodate both violations of RSTL and Stochastic Impatience because it satisfies
Independence only within – but not across – periods. A discussion of the appeal of
this specific model is naturally beyond the scope of this paper.17 The central message
15We thank Larry Selden for pointing out to us this functional form and these implications.
16Direct calculations show that if x1 > x2 and t1 < t2, then V (
1
2δ(x1,t1)+
1
2δ(x2,t2))−V (
1
2δ(x2,t1)+
1
2δ(x1,t2)) = (β
t1 − βt2)
(
u
(
v−1( 12v(x1))
)
− u
(
v−1( 12v(x2))
))
> 0.
17Previous literature has highlighted how this model violates dynamic consistency and notions of
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of this section, instead, is that one may be able to circumvent our impossibility result
by weakening Independence in ways that are different from standard ones – which we
have shown are not sufficient –, and are specific to the temporal setup.
A different way to see the content of this section is via the order in which time
and risk are aggregated. In EDU, the order of aggregation does not matter. In all
models considered before this section, the individual first aggregates time and then
aggregates risk. For example, in equation (3), first each possible contingency (a real-
ization (x, t)) is evaluated with a riskless utility that accounts for discounting; then,
these utility-equivalents are aggregated taking the expectation (across contingencies).
Such separability between mutually exclusive events is the one argued by Samuelson
(1952) to motivate the Independence axiom. Indeed, this order is the one implied
by the (full) Independence axiom itself: in any Expected Utility representation, the
aggregation across contingencies must be the last, to guarantee linearity in proba-
bilities. Weakening ‘intertemporal’ Independence allows one to switch the order of
aggregation, first evaluating each time period’s induced lottery and then aggregat-
ing those intertemporally – as in the DOCE representation considered above, where
the risk aggregation is done first within each time period and then the collection of
certainty equivalents are aggregated as in discounted utility.
4.2 Drop Stochastic Impatience, Maintain Expected Utility
An alternative way to model instances of violations of RSTL is by maintaining the
full power of Independence, but no longer requiring Stochastic Impatience to hold.
We now discuss a model that maintains the two core motivations behind EDU: expo-
nentially discounted utility for deterministic payments and the evaluation of risk by
“taking expectations.” We show that, taken together, these two motivations do not
lead to EDU. Rather, they lead to a general model that accommodates violations of
RSTL; and indeed, RSTL is a key characterizing feature of the special case of EDU.
Generalized Expected Discounted Utility. We assume that the individual’s
behavior without risk follows standard exponentially discounted utility, i.e., U(x, t) =
βtu(x) for some positive, continuous, and increasing function u over prizes and a
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). It is well-known (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982) that this
functional form is characterized by Axioms 1-2 and strengthening Non Future Bias
to Stationarity:
Axiom 3′ (Stationarity). For all x, y ∈ [w, b], s, t ∈ T , τ ∈ R with s+ τ, t+ τ ∈ T ,
if δ(x,t) ∼ δ(y,t+τ) then δ(x,s) ∼ δ(y,s+τ).
stochastic monotonicity (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Chew and Epstein, 1990; Bommier et al., 2017). This
approach also explicitly ‘disregards’ the fact that the different realizations are mutually independent.
For example, the time t certainty equivalent is calculated independently of the outcomes received in
all preceding periods.
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We also assume that, when facing non-degenerate lotteries, the individual uses
the Expected Utility criterion – so his preferences satisfy Axioms 4 and 5. Putting
together, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. % satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 3′, 4, 5;
2. There exist β ∈ (0, 1), u : [w, b]→ R++ and φ : Im
(
(β(·)u(·)
)
→ R, both strictly
increasing and continuous18 such that % is represented by
V (p) = Ep(φ(β
tu(x))).
We call this representation aGeneralized Expected Discounted Utility model (GEDU)
and identify it with the triple (u, β, φ). GEDU is similar to existing models in the lit-
erature. In particular, it can be seen as an application of the multi-attribute function
of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) to the context of time.19
Proposition 1 shows that combining the axioms that lead to exponential discount-
ing without risk with the axioms that lead to Expected Utility does not generate
EDU, but a model that includes one additional curvature, captured by the function
φ, applied after discounting has taken place. The model only coincides with EDU
when φ is affine. The proposition follows immediately from standard arguments: it
is a consequence of the fact that one cannot assume that the Bernoulli utility used in
the Expected Utility form is, cardinally, the discounted utility.20
Under EDU, time and risk preferences are both governed solely by the curvature
of u. This is no longer the case for GEDU. Intertemporal substitution is governed by
u and β: without risk, the individual evaluates a prize x payed at time t by βtu(x) (φ,
being strictly increasing, won’t matter). Atemporal risk preferences, for lotteries with
only immediate payments, are instead governed by φ◦u: a lottery p that pays only at
time 0 is evaluated by Ep(φ(u(x))). Thus, under GEDU, intertemporal substitution
and risk aversion differ – the difference captured by the curvature of φ. One possible
interpretation is that u represents the individual’s utility function over deterministic
payments, while φ represents risk attitude towards variations in ‘discounted utils.’ As
we now show, unlike EDU, GEDU does not constrain preferences to be RSTL:
Proposition 2. Consider % that admits a GEDU representation (u, β, φ). Then:
18Im((β(·)u(·)) is the image of βtu(x) over [w, b]× T .
19A similar functional form was used, but not derived, by Andersen et al. (2017), to study in-
tertemporal utility and correlation aversion, by Abdellaoui et al. (2017), to study different questions
on time and risk, as well as by Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Garrett and Pavan (2011).
20Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) show that Axioms 1-3’ imply a Discounted Utility representation
for degenerate lotteries, βtu(x). By Axioms 4 and 5, preferences over lotteries follow Expected
Utility using Bernoulli utility v, which must be ordinally, but not necessarily cardinally, equivalent
to βtu(x). Thus, there must exist a strictly increasing function φ such that v(x, t) = φ(βtu(x)).
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1. % is RSTL if and only if φ is a convex transformation of ln;
2. % is RNTL if and only if φ is an affine transformation of ln;
3. % is RATL if and only if φ is a concave transformation of ln.
To understand Proposition 2, note that if φ = ln, then φ(βtu(x)) = t ln β +
ln u(x), an affine function of t, implying RNTL. If φ is “more concave than the log,”
preferences are RATL; if it is “more convex than the log,” preferences are RSTL.
Note also that increasing the curvature of φ generates a higher risk aversion towards
both time and monetary prizes. As discussed in Section 2, the connection between
these two forms of risk aversion is supported by our experimental results.
Risk Stationarity and what is missing for EDU. In characterizing GEDU,
we imposed Stationarity only on trade-offs involving deterministic payments (Axiom
3′). Consider a strengthening to risky prospects: the ranking between two lotteries
should not change if we move all payments in the support of the lotteries by the same
number of periods. Formally, for any p ∈ ∆, let p+τ denote the lottery in which each
prize is shifted by τ periods: p+τ ((x, t+ τ)) = p((x, t)) for all (x, t) ∈ [w, b]× T .
Axiom 3′′ (Risk Stationarity). For every p, q ∈ ∆ and τ such that p+τ , q+τ ∈ T ,
p % q ⇔ p+τ % q+τ .
As usual, we say that % is strictly RSTL if any non-degenerate time lottery is
strictly preferred to receiving the prize at the expected time. Note that EDU satisfies
both strict RSTL and Risk Stationarity.21 Our next result establishes that, within
GEDU, the converse is also true. That is, starting from the properties of exponentially
discounted utility and Expected Utility, EDU is characterized by imposing both Risk
Stationarity and RSTL.22
Proposition 3. Suppose T is an interval and consider % that satisfies Axioms 1, 2,
3′′, 4, and 5 (so that it admits a GEDU representation that satisfies Risk Stationarity).
Then, % is strictly RSTL if and only if it admits an EDU representation.
21The normative appeal of Risk Stationarity, linked to dynamic consistency, is to be contrasted
with robust evidence of its violations. For example, subjects are typically more risk tolerant for
delayed payments (see Abdellaoui et al. 2011 and many references therein), which is compatible
with GEDU if φ exhibits (strictly) increasing relative risk aversion.
22There are GEDU preferences that allow for RATL while maintaining Risk Stationarity. It can
be shown that these coincide with a ‘Negative-EDU’ model, where β > 1 and the utility u is negative
(e.g., CRRA more concave than the log; a negative utility guarantees that Impatience holds even
though β > 1). While this may be a tractable model, this particular result does not carry over to
lotteries over streams of consumption.
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RATL and Stochastic Impatience under GEDU. We conclude by connecting
GEDU to our previous impossibility result. In this context, Stochastic Impatience
not only implies RSTL (as must be the case by Theorem 1), but the converse is also
true.
Proposition 4. Suppose that % admits a GEDU representation. The following
statements are equivalent:
1. The relation % satisfies Stochastic Impatience;
2. The relation % is RSTL.
Recall that, under Expected Utility, Stochastic Impatience is equivalent to φ(βtu(x))
having decreasing differences (see equation 4). To understand Proposition 4, suppose
that T is an interval, φ is twice differentiable, and u is differentiable.23 Then, de-
creasing differences holds if and only if ∂
∂x∂t
[φ (βtu (x))] ≤ 0. Let φ = g ◦ ln for
some increasing function g. Calculating the cross-partial derivative, we find that this
condition holds if and only if g is convex. Therefore, preferences satisfy Stochastic
Impatience if and only if φ is more convex than ln, which, as shown in Proposition 2,
is also the condition for preferences to be RSTL.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies attitudes towards lotteries in which both the prize and the pay-
ment date are uncertain, and their interactions with other aspects of risk and time
preferences. We introduce two notions: (i) risk attitude towards time lotteries, which
governs how an individual treats lotteries with uncertain timing, and (ii) Stochastic
Impatience, a stochastic counterpart of the standard Impatience axiom.
We show in an incentivized experiment that subjects are not consistently risk
seeking about the date of payment (RSTL), in contrast to the predictions of EDU.
The paper then makes two theoretical contributions.
First, we provide an impossibility result on modeling individuals that are not
globally RSTL. Under mild assumptions, satisfied by most generalizations of EDU
(including most forms of non-exponential discounting and non-Expected Utility), any
violation of RSTL implies that the individual must also violate Stochastic Impatience.
Second, we suggest two ways to accommodate violations of RSTL. First, we show
that a suitable relaxation of Independence, which does not require it to hold intertem-
porally, relaxes the impossibility above and allows for both violations of RSTL and
Stochastic Impatience. In the second approach, we show that if one does not require
Stochastic Impatience to hold, then violations of RSTL can be accommodated while
preserving the main behavioral features of EDU.
23We thank Rakesh Vohra for suggesting this connection.
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Conceptually, this paper suggests two new behavioral notions pertaining to the
economics of risk and time, that can be used to assess the validity of existing models.
In general, one needs to use their subjective judgment to decide to which of them to
(globally) adhere. What is common to both properties is that they make it clear why,
within the standard model of EDU, it is not innocuous to use the same parameters
elicited in a risk free environment also in the presence of risk: RSTL translates
diminishing willingness to wait into risk loving with respect the time in which a good
is received; Stochastic Impatience further shows how the simple notion of discounting
implies risk seeking towards ‘discounted utils.’
Throughout the paper, we considered lotteries over dated rewards (x, t) for ex-
positional purposes. In Appendix A, we show that both our impossibility results
generalize to preferences on lotteries over consumption streams. Similarly, both our
proposed solutions generalize. The discussion in Section 4.1 directly extends. The
extension of GEDU to this case replaces φ(βtu(x)) with φ(
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(xt)). This ver-
sion also allows for RATL, but when it does it also violates Stochastic Impatience.
The latter functional form, however, is not dynamically consistent (unless it coin-
cides with EDU). One may instead consider the model of Epstein and Zin (1989),
defined on a much richer domain of temporal lotteries, related to GEDU but dynami-
cally consistent. In Appendix B we consider its widely-used CRRA-CES version, and
show that it is capable of accommodating violations of RSTL – when risk aversion
is sufficiently greater than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
However, just as with GEDU, whenever RATL is allowed, Stochastic Impatience is
violated, showing that the main point of our impossibility result applies to the model
of Epstein and Zin as well.24
24Dillenberger et al. (2018) discuss the relation between models that separate time and risk pref-
erences (such as Epstein and Zin, 1989) and GEDU for preferences over streams, and show that
Stochastic Impatience imposes a bound on the individual’s risk aversion holding intertemporal sub-
stitution fixed.
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Appendices
These appendices contain some extensions (in Appendices A and B), the proofs of
all results except those of Appendix B (in Appendix C), and additional informa-
tion about our experiments (in Appendix D). The proofs of results in Appendix B
and the questionnaires and screenshots of our experiments are in the Supplementary
Appendix.
A Extension to Lotteries Over Consumption Streams
We now extend our results to lotteries over consumption streams. We focus on discrete
time; the case of continuous time is analogous.
Setup. Let [w, b] ⊆ R++ be an interval of prizes and let T = 0, 1, 2, ... be the set of
dates. A consumption stream is an element of [w, b]T and our primitive is a complete
and transitive preference relation %′ over simple lotteries on consumption streams,
∆([w, b]T ). For convenience, let [c, (x, t)] denote the consumption stream that returns
c ∈ [w, b] in every period (“background consumption”) except c + x in period t, i.e.,(
c, c, ..., c+ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, c, ...
)
, where c+x ∈ [w, b]. (For brevity, we will omit the requirement
that c+ x ∈ [w, b] in the definitions below.) We impose the analogous of the richness
condition for the space of consumption streams, requiring δ[c,(b−c,t+1)] ≻
′ δ[c,(w−c,t−1)]
for any t > 0 and any c.
A time lottery pc,x with prize x is a lottery over streams [c, (xi, ti))] in which all
streams have the same background consumption c and the addition x is the same in
any possible realization, that is, xi = x for all i.
Our notions of RSTL and Stochastic Impatience read in this domain as follows:
Definition 4. The relation %
′
is Risk Seeking over Time Lotteries (RSTL) if for
all time lotteries pc,x with mean date t,
pc,x %
′ δ[c,(x,t)]
for all c ∈ [w, b] and x > 0.
Definition 5. We say that %′ satisfies Stochastic Impatience if for any c ∈ [w, b],
t1, t2 ∈ T with t1 < t2, and x1 > x2 > 0,
1
2
δ[c,(x1,t1)] +
1
2
δ[c,(x2,t2)] %
′ 1
2
δ[c,(x1,t2)] +
1
2
δ[c,(x2,t1)].
In extending Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we first translate Axioms 1-3 into this
new domain. For brevity, we impose them directly on the utility function over streams
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U : [w, b]T → R; the corresponding properties on %′ are immediately derived. While
in applications one may want to impose stronger assumptions, for our purposes it
suffices to impose conditions on how streams of type [c, (x, t))] are evaluated. We
assume (i) Outcome Monotonicity: For all c ∈ [w, b] and s ∈ T, if x > y then
U([c, (x, s)]) > U([c, (y, s)]); (ii) Impatience: For all c ∈ [w, b], x > 0, and s, t ∈ T ,
if t < s then U([c, (x, t)]) > U([c, (x, s)]); and (iii) No Future Bias: For all c ∈ [w, b],
s, t ∈ T with t < s, and τ > 0 with s + τ, t + τ ∈ T , if U([c, (x, t)]) = U([c, (y, s)])
then U([c, (x, t+ τ)]) ≤ U([c, (y, s+ τ)]).
Impossibility results. We first derive the results for Expected Utility. Suppose
preferences are represented by
V (p) = Ep
[
U(x0, x1, ...)
]
(6)
for some continuous function U : [w, b]T → R satisfying assumptions (i)-(iii).
Theorem 3. Suppose %′ admits a representation as in equation (6). Then Stochas-
tic Impatience implies RSTL.
We now extend the results to preferences that admit a Generalized Local Bilinear
representation:
V
(
1
2
δ(x0,x1,... ) +
1
2
δ(x′
0
,x′
1
,... )
)
= φ
(
1
2
)
U (x0, x1, ...)+
[
1− φ
(
1
2
)]
U (x′0, x
′
1, ...) (7)
whenever U (x0, x1, ...) ≥ U (x
′
0, x
′
1, ...), for some φ(
1
2
) ∈ (0, 1) and some continuous
function U : [w, b]T → R satisfying assumptions (i)-(iii).
Theorem 4. Suppose %′ admits a representation as in equation (7). If δ[c,(x,t2)] ≻
′
1
2
δ[c,(x,t1)] +
1
2
δ[c,(x,t3)] for some x ∈ [w, b], t1, t2, t3 ∈ T with t2 =
t1+t3
2
, then % violates
Stochastic Impatience.
The proofs of the previous two theorems appear in Appendix C. They follow the
exact same steps of the proofs of the corresponding theorems in the main text, after
replacing each term U(x, t) with U([c, (x, t)]).
Solutions to model RATL. We now discuss how our solutions to model RATL
presented in Section 4 extend to this setup. The discussion in Section 4.1 generalizes
immediately; as an example, one could use the original DOCE model (Selden, 1978;
Selden and Stux, 1978); see also Selden and Wei (2019) for further discussion.
We can also easily extend the GEDU representation to this domain. It will now
be composed of a continuous and strictly increasing u : [w, b]→ R, β ∈ (0, 1), and a
strictly increasing φ : R+ → R, such that %
′ is represented by
V (p) = Ep
[
φ
(
∞∑
t=0
βtu(xt)
)]
. (8)
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This functional form is the one of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) applied to our setting.
It can be characterized, like GEDU, by imposing the axioms for Discounted Utility
and Expected Utility. It is easy to see how this model can accommodate RATL. If φ
is concave enough the value of the non-degenerate lottery gets arbitrary close to the
value of the worst element in the support (the one in which the prize x is received in
the latest possible period); against it, the individual would prefer to receive x in the
average time t¯.
From Theorem 3, whenever this model violates RSTL, it must also violate Stochas-
tic Impatience. In fact, following the same argument as in Proposition 4, it can be
shown that this model satisfies Stochastic Impatience if and only if preferences are
RSTL.
It is known, however, that if applied recursively this model is not dynamically
consistent. One solution is thus to adopt the model of Epstein and Zin (1989),
discussed below, which allows for RATL while mainting all other properties – except
violating Stochastic Impatience whenever RATL is permitted.
B Epstein-Zin Preferences
We now show that the model of Epstein and Zin (1989) (henceforth, EZ) with CRRA
Expected Utility preferences and CES aggregator can accommodate violations of
RSTL. When it does, however, it also violates Stochastic Impatience.
We adopt the same recursive setup as in their paper, which we do not discuss here
for brevity. Consider a preference relation %ˆ that admits a recursive representation
of the form:
Vt =
{
(1− β)C1−ρt + β
[
Et
(
V 1−αt+1
)] 1−ρ
1−α
} 1
1−ρ
, (9)
where Ct denotes consumption at time t, α ≥ 0 is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, and ρ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (with
α 6= 1 and ρ 6= 1, so that the formula is well-defined). EZ coincides with EDU when
α = ρ.
Since a degenerate object in this model is a consumption stream (rather than a
dated reward), we use the definitions of Stochastic Impatience and RATL as intro-
duced in Appendix A. In this setup we also need to specify when the uncertainty is
resolved: for all the lotteries in question, we assume for simplicity that the uncertainty
is resolved immediately after the current period.
We first show that EZ allows for violations of RSTL although it cannot accom-
modate (global) RATL:
Proposition 5. Under EZ, for any β, ρ, and x, there exists α¯ρ,β,x > max{ρ, 1}
such that δ(x,t)≻ˆ
1
2
δ(x,t−1)+
1
2
δ(x,t+1) if and only if α > α¯ρ,β,x. Moreover, limxց0 α¯ρ,β,x =
+∞.
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Proposition 5 shows that, controlling for discounting β, elasticity of intertemporal
substitution 1/ρ, and the size of the prize x, more risk averse individuals are more
likely to prefer the safe lottery and violate RSTL.25 That is, as with GEDU, there
is also a connection between risk aversion over time lotteries and risk aversion over
temporal lotteries in EZ. Moreover, the risky time lottery is always preferred if the
utility function is less concave than a logarithmic function (α < 1) and if α ≤ ρ.26
Since limxց0 α¯ρ,β,x = +∞, it will also be preferred if the prize x is small enough.
That is, EZ preferences cannot be (globally) RATL.
Also this model, however, cannot accommodate violations of RSTL without also
violating Stochastic Impatience:
Proposition 6. Suppose that %ˆ admits an EZ representation. Then, if %ˆ satisfies
Stochastic Impatience, it also satisfies RSTL.
This result shows that the impossibility of accommodating violations of RSTL
while preserving Stochastic Impatience (Theorem 1) carries over to this richer set-
ting. The intuition is very similar to the one previously given: the extra “intertem-
poral” risk aversion needed to accommodate RATL is going to generate a violation
of Stochastic Impatience. We refer to Dillenberger et al. (2018) for an in-depth dis-
cussion of the implications of Stochastic Impatience for EZ.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds as follows. In Step 1, we prove that any violation of RSTL implies
a violation of RSTL with binary equally-likely lotteries. In Step 2, we prove that any
violation of RSTL with binary equally-likely lotteries implies a violation of RSTL
with binary equally-likely lotteries in which dates are either consecutive, in the case
of discrete time, or are arbitrarily close, in the case of continuous time. Lastly, Step 3
proves that any such violation of RSTL implies a violation of Stochastic Impatience.
Step 1. We show that RSTL with respect to binary, equally-likely lotteries implies
RSTL with respect to arbitrary lotteries. Fix a prize x and let px be a time lottery
with prize x, where for all t, p(x, t) is a dyadic rational. For RSTL to apply, it must
be that
∑
t p(x, t)t ∈ T . Let
n∗ := max
{
n : p(x, t) = a× 2−n for some (x, t) in the support of px and a ∈ Z
}
.
25That is, α′ > α implies that if the decision maker with coefficient of risk aversion α prefers the
safe lottery over the risky one, so does the decision maker with α′ (holding other parameters fixed).
26Starting with Kreps and Porteus (1978), a large literature has studied preferences over the
timing of resolution of uncertainty. With EZ, early resolution of uncertainty is preferred if and only
if α > ρ (Epstein et al., 2014). Proposition 5 then implies that this condition is also needed for the
safe time lottery to be preferred.
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Since px is finite, n
∗ is well defined. Rewrite px as a lottery p
0
x that gives all prizes
with probabilities 2−n
∗
each. Note that each (x, t) in the support of p0x appears now
a(t) times, where a(t) = p(x,t)
2n∗
. Proceed inductively. The key observation is that we
can always group terms to rewrite p0x as a lottery p
1
x which consists of 2
n∗−1 lotteries
of the form 1
2
δ(x,t) +
1
2
δ(x,t′), with
t+t′
2
∈ T , each is obtained with probability 21−n
∗
(note that t and t′ needn’t be distinct). By Independence, the value of p1x weakly
decreases if we repeatedly replace each 1
2
δ(x,t) +
1
2
δ(x,t′) with a less preferred lottery.
And by binary RSTL, we know that 1
2
δ(x,t) +
1
2
δ(x,t′) % δ(x, t+t′
2
)
. Replace then all
of those sublotteries with δ
(x, t+t
′
2
)
. For any k ≤ n∗, proceed similarly to obtain pkx
which consists of 2n
∗−k lotteries of the form 1
2
δ(x,t) +
1
2
δ(x,t′), with
t+t′
2
∈ T , each
is obtained with probability 2k−n
∗
, and repeatedly apply Independence and binary
RSTL as above. When k = n∗, replace the last term 1
2
δ(x,t)+
1
2
δ(x,t′) with δ(x, t+t′
2
)
. By
transitivity, px % δ(x, t+t′
2
)
. Since x was arbitrary and since the set of dyadic rationals
is dense in R, continuity implies that RSTL applies for any time lottery.
Step 2. We now show that a violation of RSTL in binary, equally-likely lotteries,
implies that we can construct a violation with binary, equally-likely lotteries in which
we either have consecutive dates, with discrete time; or the dates can be arbitrarily
close, in the case of continuous time. In particular, in either case the dates are close
enough that our richness condition applies.
Claim 1. Let {L,H} ∈ T with L < H and y ∈ X such that
u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
>
u (y,H) + u (y, L)
2
.
Then, there exists t1, t2, t3 ∈ T with t1 < t2 < t3,
t1+t3
2
= t2, δ(b,t3) ≻ δ(w,t1), and
u (y, t2) >
u (y, t1) + u (y, t3)
2
.
Proof. Note that
u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
>
u (y,H) + u (y, L)
2
⇐⇒ u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
− u (y, L) > u (y,H)− u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
.
Suppose first that T is discrete. Let ∆t := u (y, t)− u (y, t− 1) . If the claim is false,
we must have ∆t decreasing in t for all t ∈ {L+ 1, ..., H}, since
u (y, t) ≤
u (y, t+ 1) + u (y, t− 1)
2
⇐⇒ ∆t = u (y, t)−u (y, t− 1) ≤ u (y, t+ 1)−u (y, t) = ∆t+1.
But
u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
− u (y, L) =
H+L
2∑
t=L+1
∆t ≥
H∑
t=H+L
2
∆t = u (y,H)− u
(
y,
H + L
2
)
,
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where the inequality uses the fact that ∆t is decreasing in t and that
H+L
2
is the
midpoint between H and L (so the summation has the same number of elements).
But this is a contradiction.
Now suppose that T is continuous. Consider ǫ ∈ R+ small enough such that
δ(b,t+ǫ) ≻ δ(w,t−ǫ) for all t ∈ [L + ǫ,H − ǫ], the existence of which is implied by
continuity. The proof for this case is then identical to the one above, simply replacing
t+ 1 and t− 1 with t+ ǫ and t− ǫ. ‖
Step 3. We now prove that a violation of RSTL as those obtained in Claim 1 imply
a violation of Stochastic Impatience. Suppose, by contradiction, that there are x and
t1 < t2 < t3 with
t1+t3
2
= t2, such that δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1)+
1
2
δ(x,t3). The assumption that
δ(b,t3) ≻ δ(w,t1) guarantees that either (i) there is x
′ < x such that δ(x′,t1) ∼ δ(x,t2), or
(ii) there is x′ > x such that δ(x′,t3) ∼ δ(x,t2), or both.
Suppose case (i) holds. Then δ(x′,t1) ∼ δ(x,t2) and by No Future Bias δ(x′,t2) - δ(x,t3).
By Independence and by the assumption above, 1
2
δ(x′,t1)+
1
2
δ(x,t2) ∼ δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1)+
1
2
δ(x,t3) %
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x′,t2). By transitivity,
1
2
δ(x′,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x′,t2),
violating Stochastic Impatience.
Suppose case (ii) holds. Then δ(x′,t3) ∼ δ(x,t2) and by No Future Bias δ(x′,t2) -
δ(x,t1). By Independence and by the assumption above,
1
2
δ(x′,t3) +
1
2
δ(x,t2) ∼ δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t3) %
1
2
δ(x′,t2) +
1
2
δ(x,t3). By transitivity,
1
2
δ(x′,t3) +
1
2
δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x′,t2) +
1
2
δ(x,t3), violating Stochastic Impatience. 
C.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider some x ∈ X and t′1, t
′
2, t
′
3 ∈ T with t
′
1 < t
′
2 < t
′
3, t
′
2 =
t′
1
+t′
3
2
such that δ(x,t′
2
) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t′
1
) +
1
2
δ(x,t′
3
). By Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, we then there must also be
t1, t2, t3 ∈ T with t1 < t2 < t3, t
′
2 =
t1+t3
2
such that not only δ(x,t2) ≻
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t3)
but we also have δ(b,t3) ≻ δ(w,t1). Denote rx :=
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t3). According to the
GLBU representation we have
V (δ(x,t2)) = U (x, t2)
and
V (rx) = π(
1
2
)U (x, t1) + (1− π(
1
2
))U (x, t3) .
Let π be the value such that V (δ(x,t2)) = V (rx), i.e.,
π =
U (x, t2)− U (x, t3)
U (x, t1)− U (x, t3)
∈ (0, 1).
The richness condition U (w, t1) < U (b, t3) guarantees that either (i) there is x
′ <
x such that U (x′, t1) = U (x, t2) ; or (ii) there is x
′ > x such that U (x′, t3) = U (x, t2);
or both.
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Consider first case (i). Take x′ < x such that U (x′, t1) = U (x, t2) . Let p =
1
2
δ(x,t1) +
1
2
δ(x′,t2) and q = 0.5δ(x′,t1) +
1
2
δ(x,t2). We have
V (p) = π(
1
2
)U (x, t1) + (1− π(
1
2
))U (x′, t2)
and
V (q) = U (x, t2) .
Let π̂ be the value such that V (p) = V (q), or
π̂ =
U (x, t2)− U (x
′, t2)
U (x, t1)− U (x′, t2)
∈ (0, 1).
Note that π(1
2
) > π̂ implies V (p) > V (q), while π(1
2
) < π implies V (δ(x,t2)) > V (r).
We will be done if we show that U (x′, t2) ≤ U (x, t3), since this implies that π̂ ≥ π, so
that Stochastic Impatience and RATL contradict one another. But this follows by No
Future Bias: since t2−t1 = t3−t2, U (x
′, t1) = U (x, t2) implies U (x
′, t1 + (t2 − t1)) ≤
U (x, t2 + (t3 − t2)), thus U (x
′, t2) ≤ U (x, t3) .
If case (i) is not satisfied, then consider now case (ii). Take x′ > x such that
U (x′, t3) = U (x, t2) . Let p =
1
2
δ(x′,t2) +
1
2
δ(x,t3) and q =
1
2
δ(x,t2) +
1
2
δ(x′,t3). We have
V (p) = π(
1
2
)U (x′, t2) + (1− π(
1
2
))U (x, t3)
and
V (q) = U (x, t2) .
Let π̂ be the value such that V (p) = V (q), or
π̂ =
U (x, t2)− U (x, t3)
U (x′, t2)− U (x, t3)
∈ (0, 1).
If U (x′, t2) ≤ U (x, t1) then we have π̂ ≥ π. But by No Future Bias (applied “back-
wards”), and since t2−t1 = t3−t2, U (x
′, t3) = U (x, t2) implies U (x
′, t3 − (t3 − t2)) ≤
U (x, t2 − (t2 − t1)), or U (x
′, t2) ≤ U (x, t1). 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
That (2) implies (1) is immediate. For the other direction, note that by Continuity,
for all (x, t) ∈ [w, b] × T the sets {(x, t) ∈ [w, b] × T : δ(x,t) % δ(y,s)} and {(x, t) ∈
[w, b]× T : δ(y,s) % δ(x,t)} are closed in the product topology on [w, b]× T . Define %
′
on [w, b] × T by (x, s) %′ (y, t) if and only if δ(x,s) % δ(y,t), and note that %
′ satisfies
Axioms A0-A5 in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). Then, by Theorem 2 in that
26
paper, there exist β ∈ (0, 1) and a strictly increasing and continuous u : [w, b]→ R++
such that
δ(x,s) % δ(y,t) ⇔ (x, s) %
′ (y, t) ⇔ βsu(y) ≥ βtu(x).27
By Independence and Continuity there exists U : [w, b]× T → R such that
p % q ⇔ Ep(U) ≥ Ep(U).
By Continuity, U is also continuous.
It follows that for all (x, s), (y, t) ∈ [w, b] × T , βsu(x) ≥ βtu(y) if and only if
U(x, s) ≥ U(y, t). Let F (x, t) = βtu(x). The existence of φ : F ([w, b]× T )→ R such
that U(x, t) = φ(F (x, t)) follows from standard arguments, as both U and F represent
the same preferences. The continuity of φ is also immediate. We are left with showing
that such φ is strictly increasing. If not, then there exist a, b ∈ F ([w, b]×T ) such that
a > b but φ(a) = φ(b). Since a, b ∈ F ([w, b]× T ), there exist (x, t), (y, s) ∈ [w, b]× T
such that F (x, t) = a > b = F (y, s), thus δ(x,t) ≻ δ(y,s). But since φ(a) = φ(b) we
have U(x, t) = U(y, s), thus δ(x,t) ∼ δ(y,s), a contradiction. 
C.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let rx be a time lottery which yields x in a random time t with Er (t) = t¯. Then
V (δ(x,t¯)) = φ
(
β t¯u (x)
)
and
V (rx) = Erφ
(
βtu (x)
)
.
Note that if φ = ln, then V (δ(x,t¯)) = V (rx) = t¯ ln β+ ln u(x). Since the distribution of
t is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of t¯, Jensen inequality implies that
V (δ(x,t¯)) ≥ (resp., ≤) V (rx) whenever there is a concave (resp., convex) function h
such that φ = h ◦ log .
Since rx was arbitrary and the domain of φ, Im
(
(β(·)u(·)
)
, is an interval, the
concavity (resp., convexity) of h needs to hold everywhere to ensure no violation of
RATL (resp., RSTL). 
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3
It is immediate that EDU satisfies Risk Stationarity and is strictly RSTL. We need
to show that any preference relation that admits a GEDU representation, satisfies
Risk Stationarity, and is strictly RSTL has an EDU representation. The proof will
use the following result:
27Recall that our domain includes only strictly positive prizes, so that we do not add the require-
ments for u on weakly negative outcomes.
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Claim 2. Let T be an interval. Consider % that admits a GEDU representation
(u, β, φ). Then, % satisfies Risk Stationarity if and only if φ has constant relative
risk aversion.
Proof. To simplify notation, let U¯ ≡ Im((β(·)u(·)) denote the domain of φ. Suppose
φ : U¯ → R does not have constant relative risk aversion. Then, there must exist a
simple lottery p with outcomes vi ∈ U¯ and expected value p¯ ≡
∑
pivi, a ∈ (0, 1) such
that avi ∈ U¯ for all i, and z¯ ∈ U¯ such that∑
piφ(vi) = φ(z¯) but
∑
piφ(avi) 6= φ(az¯).
Let
a¯ ≡ sup{a ∈ (0, 1) :
∑
piφ(avi) 6= φ(az¯)}.
There are two cases: a¯ < 1 and a¯ = 1.
Consider first the case of a¯ < 1. By the definition of the supremum,
∑
piφ(avi) =
φ(az¯) for all a ∈ (a¯, 1] and, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a′ǫ ∈ (a¯−ǫ, a¯) with
∑
piφ(avi) 6=
φ(az¯). Take τǫ ∈ T with
βτǫ =
a′ǫ
a¯
,
which exists when ǫ is small enough since limǫց0
a′ǫ
a¯
= 1. Then, it follows that p˜+τǫ ≁
q˜+τǫ , contradicting Risk Stationarity.
Next, consider the case of a¯ = 1. By the definition of the supremum, for any
ǫ > 0, there exists a′ǫ ∈ (a¯− ǫ, 1) with
∑
piφ(avi) 6= φ(az¯). Take
βτǫ = a′ǫ,
which again exists when ǫ is small enough since limǫց0 a
′
ǫ = 1. Then, it follows that
p˜+τǫ ≁ q˜+τǫ ,
contradicting Risk Stationarity. ‖
To conclude the proof of Proposition 3, note that by the previous claim and the
fact that the domain of φ is an interval, Risk Stationarity implies that φ is a power
function. Moreover, since φ is less concave than the log, it can be expressed as
φ(x) = xα for some α > 0. Therefore,
φ(βtu(x)) =
(
βtu(x)
)α
= β˜tu˜(x),
where β˜ := βα and u˜(x) := (u(x))α. 
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 2, % is RSTL if an only if φ is a convex transformation of ln. Recall
also that Stochastic Impatience holds if and only if U(x, t) = φ(βtu(x)) has decreasing
differences (see equation 4). We now show that % displays Stochastic Impatience if
and only if φ is a convex transformation of ln.
Let f : X × T → R be given by f(x, t) ≡ g (ln (βtu (x))) = g (t ln (β) + ln u (x))
for some increasing function g. The function f has decreasing differences if and only
if
f(x1, t1) + f(x2, t2) ≥ f(x1, t2) + f(x2, t1)
for all x1, x2 ∈ X and t1, t2 ∈ T with x1 > x2 and t1 < t2. We now verify that f has
decreasing differences if and only if g is convex. To see this, rewrite the condition as
g(z11) + g(z22) ≥ g(z12) + g(z21)
where zij ≡ ti ln (β) + ln u (xj). Note also that
z11 ≥ max {z12, z21} ≥ min {z12, z21} ≥ z22,
and
z11 + z22 = z12 + z21.
By the richness condition, the image of ψ(x, t) ≡ t ln (β) + ln u (x) in X × T is an
interval, so the condition becomes
g(z11) + g(z22) ≥ g(z12) + g(z21)
for all z11, z12, z21, z22 ∈ ψ(X, T ) such that z11 ≥ z12 ≥ z12 ≥ z22 with z11 + z22 =
z12 + z21, which is true if and only if g is convex. 
C.7 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
Recall that, for each fixed background consumption c, we denote by
U([c, (x, t)]) ≡ U
(
c, c, ..., c+ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, c, ..., c
)
.
the utility of receiving a prize x at date t. The proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 follow
the exact same steps as the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, after replacing U(x, t) by
U([c, (x, t)]) and holding the background consumption c fixed. 
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D Experiments
D.1 Lab Experiment: additional information
A total of 196 subjects took part in an experiment run at the Wharton Behavioral
Lab at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. We used a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire. Some questions involved immediate payments, that were made
at the end of each session. Others involved payments to be made in the future; for
these, subjects were told that their payment would be available to pick up from the
lab starting from the date indicated.28
We ran two treatments: ‘long delay’ and ‘short delay,’ labeled Long and Short in
what follows. A total of 105 and 91 subjects participated in each, respectively. The
only difference was the length of delays in some of the questions: in the Long treat-
ment, some payments were delayed by up to 12 weeks, while in the Short treatment
the maximum delay was 5 weeks.29
The experiment has three parts.30 Part I asks subjects to choose between different
time lotteries and it is the main part of our experiment. For example, the first question
asked them to choose between $15 in 2 weeks or $15 in 1 week with probability .75 and
in 5 weeks with probability .25. Subjects answered five questions of this kind. Table
2 lists the questions asked in each treatment. All questions offered two options that
paid the same prize at different dates, where the distribution of payment dates of one
option was a mean preserving spread of that of the other. In three questions, one of
the options had a known date; in the others, both options had random payment dates.
All subjects received the same first question (Question 1 in Table 2) on a separate
sheet of paper. The answer to this question is a key indication of the subjects’
28All payment dates were expressed in weeks, with the goal of reducing heterogeneity in transaction
costs between the dates, under the assumption that students have a regular schedule each week during
the semester. An email was then sent to remind them of the approaching date (they were told they
would receive it). Subjects were also given the contact details of one of the authors, at the time a
full-time faculty at Wharton. Returning to the lab to collect the payment involve transaction costs,
a typical concern. However, in our experiment all payments related to time lotteries were designed
to take place in future dates, thus holding constant the transaction cost. We have already mentioned
that a second concern may relate to the use of monetary prizes to study time preferences (Augenblick
et al., 2015). Since are interested in studying the relation between risk aversion over time lotteries
and atemporal risk aversion, and the latter is defined for monetary lotteries, we focus our experiment
on monetary prizes. As we mentioned, to test the robustness of our results to non-monetary setups,
we also conducted a real effort experiment, described in Appendix D.4.
29Testing both treatments allows us to study long times spans, where, as we have discussed in
Section 2.1, differences between time lotteries become more pronounced; as well as shorter ones,
where students’ schedules are more stable, reducing heterogeneous sources of variation. Note that
all payments were scheduled to take place during the academic school year (while school was in
session); in addition, no payment was scheduled during exam week.
30Subjects received general instructions and specific instructions about the first part when they
entered the room. Separate instructions were distributed before each of the following parts. The
order of parts and of questions was partly randomized, as we discuss below.
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Table 2: Questions in Part I
Long Delay Short Delay
Q. $$ Option 1 vs. Option 2 $$ Option 1 vs. Option 2
1 $20 2 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 5 wk $20 2 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 5 wk
2 $15 3 wk 90% 2 wk, 10% 12 wk $15 3 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 5 wk
3 $10 2 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 3 wk $10 2 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 3 wk
4 $20 50% 2 wk, 50% 3 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 4 wk $20 50% 2 wk, 50% 3 wk 75% 2 wk, 25% 4 wk
5 $15 50% 2 wk, 50% 5 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 11 wk $10 50% 2 wk, 50% 5 wk 75% 3 wk, 25% 5 wk
Notes. Each lottery pays the same prize with different delays (in weeks). Subjects in the long delay
treatment chose between ‘Option 1’ and ‘Option 2, Long Delay.’ Those in the short delay treatment
chose between ‘Option 1’ and ‘Option 2, Short Delay.’
preferences, as it captures their immediate reaction to this choice, uncontaminated
by other questions.31
Table 3: Questions in Part II
Long Delay Short Delay
Q. Option 1 vs. Option 2 Option 1 vs. Option 2
6 $10 today x in 2 wk $10 today x in 2 wk
7 $10 in 1 wk x in 2 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 2 wk
8 $10 in 1 wk x in 5 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 3 wk
9 $10 in 1 wk x in 12 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 4 wk
10 $20 in 4 wk $20, x% in 2wk, (1-x)% in 12wk $25 in 3 wk $25, x% in 2wk, (1-x)% in 5wk
11 $25 in 2 wk $25, x% in 1wk, (1-x)% in 5wk $25 in 2 wk $25, x% in 1wk, (1-x)% in 5wk
Notes. Questions 6-9 ask the amount $x that would make subjects indifferent between each option.
Questions 10-11 ask the probability x% that would make subjects indifferent between each option. These
amounts were determined using MPL.
Parts II and III use the Multiple Price List (MPL) method of Holt and Laury
(2002) to measure time and risk preferences separately.32 Part II measures standard
time preferences as well as attitudes towards time lotteries (Question 10 and 11). Part
31One potential concern with offering a list of similar questions is that subjects may ‘try’ different
answers even if they have a mild preference in one direction with some hedging concern in mind
(Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017).
32In a MPL, each question has a table with two columns and multiple rows. The subject is asked
to make a choice in each row. One of the options is always the same, while the other gets better and
better as we proceed down the rows. These questions are typically interpreted as follows: if a subject
chooses the option on the left for all rows above a point, and the option on the right below that point,
then the indifference point should be where the switching takes place. Subjects who understand the
procedure should not switch more than once. This is indeed the case for the large majority of
answers: 13% of subjects gave a non-monotone answer in at least one of the 12 MPL questions, and
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Table 4: Questions in Part III
Q. Option 1 vs. Option 2
12 $15 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
13 50% of $15, 50% of $8 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
14 20% of $15, 80% of $8 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
15 $20 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $5
16 50% of $20, 50% of $5 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $3
17 10% of $20, 90% of $5 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $3
Notes. Questions ask the probability x% that would make subjects indifferent between each option,
determined using MPL. All payments were scheduled for the day of the experiment.
III measures atemporal risk preferences, with payments taking place immediately at
the end of the session. These include questions to measure regular risk aversion,
as well as Allais’ common-ratio-type questions, that allow us to test and quantify
violations of Expected Utility theory. Tables 3 and 4 include the list of questions
asked in these two parts.
At the end of the experiment one question was randomly selected from Parts I, II,
and III for payment. The randomization of the question selected for payment, as well
as the outcome of any lottery, was resolved with dice.33 Crucially, all uncertainty was
resolved at the end of the experiment, including the one regarding payment dates.
The instructions explicitly stated that subjects would know all payment dates before
leaving the room.
The order of parts and of questions within parts was partly randomized at a session
level. Because Part I is the key one, all subjects saw it first to avoid contamination.
For the same reason, within Part I, Question 1 was always the same. All other
elements were randomized.34 We find no significant effects of ordering.35
only 4.6% gave non-monotone answers in more than one. These are substantially lower numbers (i.e.,
fewer violations) than what previous studies have found (Holt and Laury, 2002). The non-monotone
behavior did not concentrate in any specific question. Following the typical approach, these answers
are disregarded. Alternatively, we could have dropped any subject that exhibits a non-monotone
behavior at least once; this leave our results essentially unchanged.
33 Specifically, one participant was selected as ‘the assistant,’ using the roll of a die. This subject
was then in charge of rolling the die and checking the outcomes. This was done to reduce the fear
that the experimenter could manipulate the outcome. All was clearly explained beforehand.
34Specifically: for questions in Part I other than the first, half of the subjects answered questions
in one specific order (the one used above), while the other half used a randomized order. In each of
them, which option appears on the left and which on the right was also determined randomly. The
order of Parts II and III was randomized. For both parts, it was determined randomly whether in the
MPL the constant option would appear on the left or on the right. This was done (independently)
for each part, but not for each question within a part: in Part II or III the constant option of
the MPL was either on the left or on the right for all questions of that part. This is typical for
experiments that use the MPL method, as it makes the procedure easier to explain.
35The only exception is that out of the five questions in the first part, subjects have a significant
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We conclude by noting that our incentive scheme, the random payment mecha-
nism, as well as the Multiple Price List method, are incentive compatible for Expected
Utility maximizers, but not necessarily for more general preferences over risk.36 Since
this is the procedure used by most studies, a significant methodological work has
been done to examine whether this creates relevant differences, with some reassuring
results.37
D.2 Lab Experiments: Results
We start from the main variable of interest: risk attitude towards time lotteries. This
can be measured in three different ways. First, we can measure it using Question 1
of Part I, the first question that subjects see. Second, we can look at the answers to
all five questions in Part I and ask whether subjects exhibited RATL in the majority
of them (for the purpose of this section, we say that subjects are RATL in a given
question if, in that question, they chose the option with the smallest variance of the
payment date). A third way is to look at the answers given in Questions 10 and 11
of Part II, that compute RATL using MPL.
Table 5 presents the percentage of RATL answers for each of these measures.
The results are consistent: in most questions, especially in the Long treatment, the
majority of subjects are RATL. Note that most subjects are still RATL when both
options are risky but one of the options is a mean preserving spread of the other
(Questions 4 and 5). Thus, the data suggest an aversion to mean preserving spreads,
not simply an attraction towards certainty.
In most questions, RATL is stronger in the Long rather than in the Short treat-
ment. We have already discussed in Section 2.1 how this is the opposite of what is
predicted by EDU.
While most answers are consistent with RATL, it could be that a non-trivial
fraction of our subjects still consistently chooses the risky option, as predicted by
EDU. Table 6 shows that this is not the case: the fraction of subjects who does so is
(moderate) preference for the option on the right in the second question. While this is most likely a
spurious significance (due to the large number of tests run), the order was randomized for all sessions
and thus this should have no impact on our analysis.
36Holt (1986) points out that a subject who obeys the Reduction of compound lotteries but
violates the Independence axiom may make different choices under a randomly incentivized elicitation
procedure than he would make in each choice in isolation. Conversely, if the decision maker treats
compound lotteries by first assessing the certainty equivalents of all first stage lotteries and then
plugging these numbers into a second stage lottery (as in Segal, 1990), then this procedure is incentive
compatible. Karni and Safra (1987) prove the non-existence of an incentive compatible mechanism
for general non-Expected Utility preferences.
37Beattie and Loomes (1997), Cubitt et al. (1998) and Hey and Lee (2005) all compare the behavior
of subjects in randomly incentivized treatments to those that answer just one choice, and find little
difference. Also encouragingly, Kurata et al. (2009) compare the behavior of subjects that do and
do not violate Expected Utility in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (which is strategically
equivalent to MPL) and find no difference. On the other hand, Freeman et al. (2019) find that
subjects tend to choose the riskier lottery more often in choices from lists than in pairwise choices.
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Table 5: Percentage of RATL in
each question
Question Long Short
1 65.71 56.04
2 50.48 54.95
3 48.57 37.36
4 64.76 38.46
5 73.33 52.75
Majority in 1-5 64.76 49.45
10 44.23 54.44
11 57.28 41.11
Either in 10 or 11 64.07 66.66
Table 6: Frequency of RATL answers in Part I
Frequency of
RATL
Long Delay Short Delay
Percent Cum. Percent Cum.
0 2.86 2.86 9.89 9.89
1 9.52 12.38 16.48 26.37
2 22.86 35.24 24.28 50.55
3 23.81 59.05 26.37 76.92
4 28.57 87.62 19.78 96.70
5 12.38 100.00 3.30 100
minuscule in the Long treatment (2.86%) and very small in the Short one (9.89 %).
By contrast, in the Long treatment almost 41% give risk averse answers at least 4 out
of 5 times, and 59% at least three times. (These numbers are about 23% and 48.45%
in the Short treatment.)
Overall, these finding are not compatible with RSTL and thus with EDU: only
a minuscule fraction of subjects is consistently risk seeking over time lotteries, while
the majority is tends to be risk averse over time lotteries. Thus, the assumption of
risk seeking over time lotteries, implicitly present when using EDU, does not seem to
have a positive appeal. Finally, recall that in Section 2.1 we have already discussed
how our data is also not compatible with standard stochastic choice extensions of
EDU.
D.3 RATL, Convexity, Expected Utility, and Risk Aversion
We now turn to analyze the relationship between RATL and convex discounting,
violations of Expected Utility, and atemporal risk aversion. Under EDU, all subjects
with convex discounting should be RSTL; in turn, this means that such tendency
should be negatively related to convexity of the discount function. Under GEDU,
RATL should be positively correlated with atemporal risk aversion. Finally, if RATL
were due to violations of Expected Utility, as suggested by Chesson and Viscusi (2003)
and Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007), then it should be linked to certainty bias and violations
of Expected Utility.
We quantify convexity of the discount function, violations of Expected Utility,
and atemporal risk aversion using the MPL measures collected in Parts II and III.
We determine which subjects have convex discounting based on their answers in
Part II (see Questions 7, 8, and 9 in Table 3). Unsurprisingly, we find that 82% of
our subjects exhibit it (this is an established finding). From the questions in Part
III we can construct two related measures of violations of Expected Utility. First,
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Table 7: Proportion of RATL subjects
Sample Convex Discounting Approximately Exp. Ut. No Certainty Bias
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short
Question 1 67.78 50.70∗ 66.67 60.61 67.50 55.00
Majority in Q1-5 65.56 43.66∗∗ 64.29 60.61∗ 68.75∗ 50.00
Question 10 46.07 52.86 54.76∗ 68.75∗∗ 47.50 51.90
Question 11 57.95 44.29∗∗ 64.29 56.25 54.43 48.10
Observations 90 71 42 33 80 80
Notes. The first row measures RATL using Question 1. The second row identifies as RATL subjects
who chose the safe option in the majority of Questions 1-5. The third and fourth rows use answers
to MPL Questions 10 and 11. Columns present the proportion of RATL subjects in the subsamples
of subjects with convex discounting, approximately Expected Utility, and those with no Certainty
Bias as measured using Questions 12 and 13. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 10% and 5% level
in a Chi-squared test of whether each subset is different from its complement (within the Long or
Short treatments).
we can determine if subjects exhibit certainty bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
which is implied by pessimistic probability weighting.38 We find that a small number
of subjects exhibit it (15.71%).39 Second, we can use the same three questions to
determine whether the subjects give answers that are jointly consistent with Expected
Utility. Since this is a very demanding requirement – it is well-known that these
measures are very noisy –, we consider as “approximately Expected Utility” those
subjects who would abide by Independence across all three questions if we changed
their answer in at most one of the lines. This holds for 39.89% of the pool.
Table 7 shows that, based on the four different measures, subjects are still RATL
in each of the subsamples above. The table also shows the significance of Chi-squared
tests on whether subjects consistent with a given property (e.g., Convex Discounting)
are statistically different from same-treatment subjects who are not consistent with
38 This could be done using Questions 12 and 13, or 12 and 14 (see Table 4). Suppose that in
Question 12 the subject switches at x12, while in Question 13 she switches at x13. If the subject
follows Expected Utility, we should have 2x13 = x12. A certainty-biased subject would instead have
x12 > 2x13; because she is attracted by the certainty of Option 1 in Question 12, she demands
a high probability of receiving the high prize in Option 2 to be indifferent. Thus, the answers to
Question 12 and 13 allow us to identify subjects who are certainty biased and to quantify it. In
what follows, when we need to identify subjects who are certainty biased, we use this measure. A
similar measure can be obtained from the answers to Questions 12 and 14; the results are essentially
identical. When we need to quantify certainty bias (in the regression analysis), we use instead the
principal component of the two measures, which should reduce the observation error (essentially
identical results hold using either of the two measures or their average).
39These small numbers are not surprising: it is a stylized fact that certainty bias is less frequent
when stakes are small, as in this part of our experiment (Conlisk, 1989; Camerer, 1989; Burke et al.,
1996; Fan, 2002; Huck and Mu¨ller, 2012). See the discussion in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015).
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that property. We find a majority of RATL among subjects who either exhibit convex
discounting, or who exhibit no certainty bias, or who are “approximately Expected
Utility.” In most cases there is no significant difference in the proportions of RATL
between these groups and their complement. These results are in direct contrast with
the predictions of EDU, and with the explanation of RATL suggested by Chesson
and Viscusi (2003) and Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007) based on probability weighting:
according to the former, there should be no RATL with convex discounting; according
to the latter, there should be no RATL without certainty bias, or for subjects that
(approximately) follow Expected Utility. Tables 8 and 9 present regression analyses
to confirm these results: they show how certainty bias or convexity of discounting is
generally not related, or poorly related, to the tendency to exhibit RATL.
Table 8: Probit Regressions: RATL and Convexity and Certainty Bias
Dep. Variable RATL Q1 RATL Majority Q1-5 RATL Q10 RATL Q11
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Certainty Bias -.25∗ .18 -.20 .18 -.03 .44∗∗∗ .16 .23
(-1.94) (1.17) (-1.60) (1.20) (-.25) (2.77) (1.42) (1.52)
Convexity 4.27∗ -4.45 .06 -11.10∗∗∗ 3.47 -1.77 .99 -7.73∗∗
(1.82) (-1.29) (.03) (-2.86) (1.64) (-1.29) (.46) (-2.16)
Constant .19 .28∗ .39∗∗ .19 -.26 .16 .19 .12
(1.07) (1.82) (2.15) (1.20) (-1.52) (1.03) (1.08) (.79)
Pseudo-R2 .06 .02 .02 .01 .02 .07 .02 .06
Obs. 92 86 92 86 92 85 92 85
Notes. Dependent variables are indicated in the first row. Coefficients in brackets are z-statistics. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
All our findings thus far are compatible with the GEDU model. However, as
we pointed out, GEDU makes one additional prediction: RATL should be related
to standard atemporal risk aversion. Tables 10 and 11 present the coefficients from
Probit regressions with our four RATL measures as dependent variables and the
degree of risk aversion (as measured in Question 12) as the independent variable.
Consistently with the model, the coefficients are positive and, with the exception of
the Short treatment in Question 1, they are all statistically significant at the 5% level.
(Similar results hold constructing risk aversion from other questions, e.g., Question
15, or using a linear probability model.)
To summarize, we find that subjects who are either (i) approximately Expected
Utility maximizers, or (ii) satisfy either convex discounting, or (iii) satisfy no certainty
bias, also have a tendency to be RATL. In fact, the proportions in these groups are
almost identical to the one in the overall population. Regression analysis shows
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Table 9: Probit Regressions: RATL and Convexity and Certainty Bias
Dep. Var. RATL Q.10 RATL Q.11
Treatment Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convexity 3.63∗ -1.59 1.13 -7.59∗∗
(1.73) (-0.49) (0.55) (-2.20)
Cert. Bias -.05 .45∗∗∗ .19∗ .18
(-0.52) (2.84) (1.71) (1.23)
Constant -.29∗ -.11 .13 .13 .12 .24∗ .12 .01
(-1.79) (-.88) (.88) (.92) (0.75) (1.80) (.81) (0.05)
Pseudo-R2 .02 .01 .01 .07 .01 .02 .04 .01
Obs. 101 95 87 87 100 95 87 87
Notes. Same as Table 8. Each regression excludes one dependent variable.
that RATL is unrelated to violations of Expected Utility and generally unrelated to
convexity. It is, however, related to (atemporal) risk aversion. These findings are not
compatible with RSTL, EDU, or to explanations based on probability weighting, but
they are compatible with GEDU.
D.4 Real Effort Experiment
Our main experiment presented above uses monetary incentives. A recent literature
has expressed concerns about the use of such incentives to study intertemporal pref-
erences (Augenblick et al., 2015). To test the robustness of our main finding, we also
conducted a real-effort experiment with time lotteries over effort relief. We adapted
the design of DellaVigna and Pope (2018) to the study of time lotteries.
Design. We recruited 156 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk, focusing on sub-
jects in the United States with at least 100 HITs completed with a 95% success rate.
The experiment involved real-effort tasks to be completed in three different periods:
one, two, and three weeks after the initial experiment. The real-effort task, adapted
from DellaVigna and Pope (2018), each week consisted of alternatively pressing the
“a” and “b” buttons on their keyboard 750 times. This task takes about five minutes
on average, and participants were informed about both the task and the average time
prior to answering any questions..
During the initial experiment, subjects were showed the work schedule, the in-
centives, and were asked three incentivized questions about preferences over time
lotteries, taking the following form. In the first question, they were asked if they
preferred to skip work in week 2, or if they preferred to skip work in week 1 or 3
with equal probability. If they chose the latter, the computer will randomize and
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Table 10: Probit Regressions: RATL and Atemporal Risk Aversion
Dep. Variable RATL Q.1 RATL Majority Q.1-5 RATL Q.10 RATL Q.11
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk Aversion, .336∗∗ .175 .308∗∗ .341∗∗ .459∗∗∗ .435∗∗∗ .571∗∗∗ .239∗
Atemporal (2.41) (1.30) (2.27) (2.40) (3.27) (2.91) (3.81) (1.75)
Constant .07 -.01 .07 -.34∗ -.60∗∗∗ -.28 -.37∗∗∗ -.19
(0.38) (-0.07) (0.38) (-1.79) (-3.01) (-1.47) (-1.87) (-1.08)
Pseudo-R2 0.047 0.014 0.040 0.049 0.083 0.076 0.121 0.025
Observations 101 90 101 90 101 89 100 89
Notes. Dependent variables are indicated in the first row. Atemporal risk aversion measure is
obtained from Question 12. RATL measures were obtained from Question 1 (Regressions 1 and 2),
having chosen the safe option in the majority of Questions 1-5 (Regressions 3 and 4), and MPL
Questions 10 and 11 (Regressions 5-8). Coefficients in brackets are z-statistics. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 11: Probit Regressions: RATL and Atemporal Risk Aversion
Dep. Var. RATL Q.1 RATL Majority Q.1-5
Treatment Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cert. Bias -.19 .18 -.21∗ .12
(-1.56) (1.20) (-1.71) (0.82)
Convexity 3.73∗ -4.17 -.39 -10.60∗∗∗
(1.68) (-1.25) (-0.19) (-2.83)
Constant .22 .40∗∗∗ .25∗ .19 .41∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .15 .01
(1.35) (2.93) (1.67) (1.41) (2.50) (2.75) (1.02) (.09)
Pseudo-R2 .02 .02 .01 .01 .01 .03 .07 .01
Obs. 101 95 88 88 101 95 88 88
Notes. Same as Table 8. Each regression excludes one dependent variable.
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communicate it to them at the end of the section (a few minutes later). Skipping
work meant that subjects were not required to complete the real-effort task but still
receive the payment as well as the final bonus (described below). It is easy to see
how this constitutes a time lottery, as the benefit (skip work) has a stochastic date.
Question 2 offered them the option between skipping work with 50% chance in week
1 and 50% in week 2 vs. 75% in week 1 and 25% in week 3. In question 3 the options
were skipping with 66% chance in week 2 and 34% in week 3 vs. 34% in week 1 and
66% in week 3.40 Subjects were also asked a brief question to test that they are are
human and comprehend English. (Everyone passed it.)
At the end of the initial experiment, one of the three questions was randomly
selected and subjects were told their work schedule based on the options they chose
for that question and the resolution of the lottery. They were paid $5 if they complete
the initial survey and $3 per week if they adhered to the work plan, i.e., completed
the real-effort task unless they were allowed to skip. Each week, they were also sent
a 5 cents reminder of the task to be completed, as well as their entire work schedule.
Finally, they received a $5 bonus if they completed the whole plan.
Results. Out of the 156 subjects who participated in the first session, we eliminate
5 as they encountered technical issues, and report the results for the remaining ones.
(Results are very similar if we include them.) Of them, 89% (135) of subjects com-
pleted at least one week of the task, and 76% (115) the whole work plan. Results are
again very similar for either subgroup.
Table 12: Frequency of RATL
Frequency of RATL Percent Cumulative
0 21.9% 21.9%
1 27.2% 49.0%
2 33.8% 82.8%
3 17.2% 100%
Table 13: RATL in each question
Question
1 49.0%
2 51.7%
3 45.7%
Majority of questions 51.0%
Tables 12 and 13 show that in this task as well only a minority of subjects con-
sistently picks the RSTL options, even though this percentage is higher than in the
lab experiment (23.8%). Here as well, a majority of subjects chooses the RATL op-
tion in the majority of questions (51%). Note also that choosing the RSTL option
in one question is positively correlated with choosing it in another question. Indeed,
even though the answers to individual questions were not far from 50%, the overall
distribution has more mass on the tails (all RATL or all RSTL) than a binomial
distribution, for which the frequency of 0 to 3 RATL choices would be (0.125, 0.375,
40Note that in Question 3, the second option is a mean-reducing spread of the second one, i.e., it
has higher variance but also a marginally lower mean. That is, ties are broken in favor of the RSTL
option.
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0.375, 0.125). Our observed frequency is statistically different from this distribution
(Chi-Square Goodness of Fit, p = 0.0004). This suggests that the patterns we observe
are not random, but rather are due to one group exhibiting RATL and one group
exhibiting RSTL preferences.
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